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We study the exposure of the U.S. corporate bond returns to liquidity shocks of stocks and treasury
bonds over the period 1973 to 2007. A decline in liquidity of stocks or Treasury bonds produces conflicting
effects: Prices of investment-grade bonds rise while prices of speculative grade bonds fall substantially.
This effect is regime-switching in nature and holds when the state of the economy is in a "stress" regime.
The likelihood of being in such a regime can be predicted by macroeconomic and financial market
variables that are associated with adverse economic conditions. Our model can predict the out-of-sample
bond returns for the stress years 2008-2009. These effects are robust to controlling for other systematic
risks (term and default). Our findings suggest the existence of time-varying liquidity risk of corporate
bond returns and episodes of flight to liquidity.
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Liquidity shocks a®ect asset prices because asset liquidity a®ects expected returns of both
stocks and bonds (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, 1991). Because asset illiquidity is per-
sistent (highly autoregressive), an unexpected rise in illiquidity raises expected illiquidity.
Consequently, investors require higher expected returns, which makes asset prices fall if the
rise in illiquidity does not have an appreciable positive e®ect on assets' cash°ow. This gener-
ates a negative liquidity beta of assets, i.e., a negative relationship between illiquidity shocks
and asset realized returns, which is documented for stocks by Amihud (2002), for bonds by
deJong and Driessen (2004) and Liu, Wang and Wu (2010), and is employed by Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Sadka (2006) in analyzing the e®ect of
liquidity risk on the expected return of stocks. However, these papers examine the uncondi-
tional e®ect of liquidity risk, that is, averaged over time. In particular, this body of research
has by and large not yet examined the casual observation that the impact of liquidity shocks
on asset prices is highly conditional, signi¯cantly stronger in bad economic times. Acharya
and Pedersen (2005) note that signi¯cant illiquidity episodes in the stock market were pre-
ceded by signi¯cant macroeconomic or market-wide shocks during the period 1964-1999,1
and Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) suggest a regime-switching pattern of response of stock
returns to liquidity, but they do not relate it to macroeconomic conditions.2
This paper shows that the response of corporate bond prices to liquidity shocks of stocks
and Treasury bonds varies over time in a systematic way, switching between two regimes
which we call \normal" and \stress." We ¯rst identify the two regimes statistically as those
when the e®ects of liquidity shocks, as well as those of term and default risk, di®er between
the two regimes, employing Hamilton's (1989) methodology. Our important result is that
the two regimes can be predicted by macroeconomic and ¯nancial variables. We ¯nd that
the periods of stress are associated with adverse macroeconomic conditions, such as recessed
economic activity, and adverse ¯nancial market conditions such as negative stock market
returns and heightened volatility. Finally, employing these predictions of being in the normal
or the stress regime, we provide out-of-sample prediction of corporate bond returns for
the years 2008-2009. Regressions of monthly realized returns on predicted returns produce
R2 of 74% and 77% for junk and investment grade bonds, respectively. The coe±cients
on predicted return are close to one and the intercepts are close to zero (di®erences are
1Over the period 1963 to 1999, they identify these shocks to be 5/1970 (Penn Central commercial paper
crisis), 11/1973 (oil crisis), 10/1987 (stock market crash), 8/1990 (Iraqi invasion of Kuwait), 4-12/1997
(Asian crisis) and 610/1998 (Russian default, LTCM crisis).
2See also Fujimoto (2003)
3statistically insigni¯cant). As shown in Figure 5, the predicted return does a reasonable job
at predicting the returns of March 2008 (Bear Stearns' collapse) and September to December
2008 (Lehman Brothers' collapse and the post-Lehman phase).3
Our analysis reveals a pattern of \°ight to liquidity" only in the stress regime, wherein
investors prefer to hold more liquid assets such as investment grade (IG) bonds rather than
the less liquid non-investment-grade (\junk") bonds. We ¯nd that the response of bond
returns to liquidity shocks in the stress regime is quite the opposite for IG and junk bonds.
Whereas junk bond returns respond negatively to illiquidity shocks in stress, IG bond re-
turns respond positively. In the normal regime, there is no signi¯cant di®erence in response
to liquidity shocks between IG and junk bonds. This pattern is robust to controlling for
maturity and default risk.
2 Summary of our model and results
We estimate a two-regime switching regression model, which we later show to pertain to
normal time or to time of economic stress. There are two regression models, one for IG
bonds and one for junk bonds in which we regress monthly bond returns (in excess of the
30-day T-bill rate) on innovations in two illiquidity indexes of stock and bonds, and on two
bond return factors which capture the excess return on maturity-related and default-related
portfolios of bonds. These factors have been used in earlier studies.
We obtain that for junk-bond returns, the betas of the two illiquidity factors are sta-
tistically insigni¯cant in normal times, but they become highly negative and signi¯cant in
the stress regime. In contrast, the default factor beta does not change appreciably in the
stress regime, and the coe±cient of the maturity factors changes very little. A one standard
deviation in either of the liquidity factors in time of stress produces between one tenth to
one ¯fth of a standard deviation of bond returns, compared to only one twentieth (or less)
of a standard deviation shock in returns during normal times. In other words, during stress
times, the e®ect of liquidity risk on junk bond returns rises by a factor of two to four times
compared to normal times.
The response of IG bond prices to innovations in illiquidity is quite the opposite of that
of junk bonds. In the stress regime, IG bond prices respond positively to innovations in
3In another out-of-sample test we start with the second half of the sample and progressively estimate
the best econometric ¯t using macroeconomic and ¯nancial-market variables that explain the model-implied
probability of being in the stress regime until the previous month, and use it to predict the probability of
being in the stress regime this month. The prediction has signi¯cant power with an accuracy of over 89%.
4illiquidity, particularly to innovations in bond illiquidity. This is in addition to the rise in
the IG bond returns betas on both maturity and default factors in the stress regime. In
stress time, these two betas become insigni¯cantly di®erent from the maturity and default
betas of junk bonds, while in normal time, the maturity and default betas are signi¯cantly
lower for IG bonds than they are for junk bonds.
We propose an economic meaning for our statistically-driven regimes by showing how
they relate to macroeconomic and ¯nancial market conditions. The regime-switching esti-
mation provides a model-implied probability of a given month being in the normal regime
or the stress regime. We then regress the probability of being in the stress regime on lagged
macroeconomic and ¯nancial market variables: the NBER recession dummy, Stock and Wat-
son index of leading economic indicators, the probability of being in a recession based on
Hamilton's model, a dummy variable for negative market return, and the business condi-
tions index (Arouba, Diebold and Scotti, 2009), the yield spread between commercial paper
and Treasury bills, the yield spread between the Eurodollar and Treasury bill rate, stock
market volatility, and the interaction of stock market volatility and past year's growth in
broker-dealer balance-sheets (as measured by Etula (2009)). The estimated coe±cients of
these variables indicate that the stress regime is associated with adverse macroeconomic and
¯nancial market conditions, that is, economic stress. For example, the likelihood of being
in the stress regime is positively related to the NBER recession dummy variable, with the
relationship being very highly signi¯cant. The best econometric ¯t using all of the indicators
explains about 42% of the time-series variation in model-implied probability of being in the
stress regime.
The varying response of bond prices to illiquidity innovations in periods of stress indicates
that investors become less willing to hold junk bonds relative to IG bonds which are known
to be more liquid (see Chen et al., 2007). Another interpretation is that illiquidity shocks
foretell heightened investor risk-aversion to extreme events or rare disasters (Rietz, 1988 and
Barro, 2006) which induces an aversion to riskier assets such as junk bonds. Yet another
explanation is the volatility feedback explanation of Campbell and Hentschel (1992) that
increases in aggregate volatility necessitate a reduction in investor holdings of risky assets,
which reduces their contemporaneous returns. To distinguish between these explanations,
we examine the return on junk bonds relative to IG bonds and ¯nd that greater default risk
in the stress regime is associated with more negative junk-IG di®erential return, consistent
with a °ight to quality. However, adding interaction e®ects of the stress regime with liquidity
innovations on both bonds and stocks to explain the junk-IG di®erential return increases the
5explanatory power of the model by 70%, underscoring the importance of the °ight to liquidity
e®ects. We ¯nd that greater illiquidity of stocks and treasury bonds signi¯cantly lowers the
junk-IG di®erential return in the stress regime, consistent with a °ight to liquidity e®ect.
We further ¯nd that the reaction of the junk-IG bond returns to illiquidity shocks in times of
stress is monotonically increasing with bond maturity, being more negative for longer-term
bonds. This is in addition to the e®ect of default risk in stress time being more negative
as a function of bond maturity. Again, we ¯nd that the °ight to liquidity in times of stress
is distinct from the °ight to liquidity. The default premium itself, while being a®ected by
liquidity shocks, does not have excess response to liquidity shocks in time of stress. This
shows that the e®ects of liquidity shocks on the junk-IG bond di®erential in time of stress
is not associated with the e®ect of default risk.
In a further test that di®erentiates between °ight to liquidity and to safety, we study how
the negative of the prices of T-bills responds to liquidity shocks in time of stress (relative to
the Federal Funds rate). Treasury bills are high \quality" assets, being an investment that
is both safe and highly liquid. We ¯nd that the T-bill price rises during the stress regime,
and it rises furthermore if there is also a rise then in bond illiquidity. This re°ects °ight to
liquidity when, in times of stress, similar to the pattern observed for investment grade bonds.
In contrast, treasury bill returns do not react to increase in default risk in the stress regime.
This is also consistent with a stronger °ight-to-liquidity phenomenon than a °ight-to-quality
one.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3 describes the data we employ.
Sections 4 and 5 present results for our unconditional and conditional liquidity risk tests,
respectively. Section 5 also reports results of the out-of-sample tests. Section 6 discusses
additional related literature. Section 7 concludes.
3 Data
Our bond data are extracted from the Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database distributed
by Warga (1998) and supplemented by the Merrill Lynch corporate bond index database
used by Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008). We follow closely the data extraction methodology
outlined by Bharath and Shumway (2008) for the Warga (1998) database. The Warga
(1998) database contains monthly price, accrued interest, and return data on all corporate
and government bonds over the period January 1971-March 1997. We use the data from the
1973-1997 period when coverage became wide spread. This is the database used by Elton et
6al. (2001) to explain the yield spread on corporate bonds, and by Gebhardt et al. (2005) in
their study of cross section of bond returns. In addition, the database contains descriptive
data on bonds, including coupons, ratings, and callability.
This study uses a subset of the data in the Warga database by employing several selection
criteria. First, we include only bonds that were priced by traders or dealers and eliminate
bonds that were matrix priced.4 This rule is similar to that behind the CRSP government
bond ¯le, which is the standard academic source of government bond data. Next, we elimi-
nate all bonds with special features that would result in them being priced di®erently. This
means that we eliminate all bonds with options (e.g. callable bonds or bonds with a sinking
fund), with °oating rates, with an odd frequency of coupon payments, and in°ation-indexed
bonds. In addition, we eliminate all bonds not included in the Lehman Brothers bond in-
dexes, because researchers in charge of the database at Lehman Brothers indicated that the
care in preparing the data was much less for bonds not included in their indexes. This also
results in eliminating data for all bonds with a maturity of less than one year.
These data are supplemented by data on monthly prices of corporate bonds that are
included either in the Merrill Lynch Corporate Master index or in the Merrill Lynch Corpo-
rate High Yield index used by Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008). These indexes include most
rated US publicly issued corporate bonds. The data cover the period from December 1996 to
December 2007. The selection criteria used for the Lehman database were also used with the
Merrill database. Thus, during the overlapping period between the two databases (December
1996 to March 1997), the constituent bonds in the two databases are nearly identical. In
the Lehman database all bonds have missing data in August 1975 and December 1984, and
their prices are replaced by interpolated prices. Most bond issues are rated by both S&P
and Moody's and the ratings agree with each other. We eliminate unrated bonds and bonds
whose rating by S&P and Moody's is not the same for the broad letter-based categories.
The monthly corporate bond return as of time ¿ + 1, r¿+1 is computed as
r¿+1 =
P¿+1 + AI¿+1 + C¿+1 ¡ P¿ ¡ AI¿
P¿ + AI¿
: (1)
P¿ is the quoted price in month ¿; AI¿ is accrued interest, which is just the coupon payment
scaled by the ratio of days since the last payment date to the days between last payment and
4For actively traded bonds, dealers quote a price based on recent trades of the bond. We eliminate bonds
for which a dealer did not supply a price because they have prices determined by a rule of thumb relating
the characteristics of the bond to dealer-priced bonds. These rules of thumb tend to change very slowly over
time and do not respond to changes in market conditions. For matrix prices, all that our analysis uncovers
may be the rule used to matrix-price bonds rather than the economic in°uences at work in the market.
7next payment; and C¿+1 is the semiannual coupon payment (if any) in month ¿ +1. For the
bond return indexes that we use, we value weight the monthly returns of all eligible bonds in
each rating class by the total amount outstanding of each bond. This reduces signi¯cantly
price errors for particular bonds. In our sample over the period 1973-2007, there were on
average 2,234 bonds in each month, with a minimum number of of 245 and a maximum
number of 9,286. The maximum number of months in our sample period is 420, but data
are missing for some rating classes in some months.
ENTER TABLE 1
Table 1 Panel A reports the summary statistics of the returns (in basis points, denoted
bps) on corporate bond aggregated into value-weighted indexes by rating classes. As ex-
pected, the mean and standard deviation of bond returns are greater for bonds with greater
default risk. The monthly mean return on AAA-rated bonds is 67.2 bps with standard devi-
ation of 134.5 bps, and for CCC bonds, the mean and standard deviation are, respectively,
160.3 bps and 332.0 bps. For most of our analysis, we rely on groupings into investment-
grade (\IG," BBB-rated and above) and high-yield speculative (\junk," below BBB rated)
bonds. For this grouping, we ¯nd that the return on IG and junk bonds are, respectively,
67.6 and 97.6 bps and the respective standard deviations are 127.3 and 177.9 bps.
We follow Fama and French (1993) in using two common risk factors for corporate bonds,
TERM and DEF, which re°ect unexpected changes in the term structure of interest rates and
in default risk. Fama and French (1993) justify these choices by an ICAPM setting in which
these two factors are hedging portfolios.5 Following Gebhardt et al (2005), we calculate the
factor TERM as the di®erence in the monthly long-term thirty-year government bond return
(from Ibbotson Associates) and one month T-bill returns (from the Center for Research in
Security Prices, CRSP), and the factor DEF as the di®erence between the monthly return on
a equally-weighted market portfolio of all corporate bonds with at least one year to maturity
and the average return on government bonds. For the latter we average the returns on
one-year and thirty-year government bonds because corporate bonds in the sample used to
construct the DEF factor have maturities from one to thirty years.6 The equally-weighted
corporate bond returns better capture the extreme default outcomes each month.
5Following the suggestions and results in Gebhardt et al (2005), we do not include the market factor
because empirically they found that the market factor has almost no explanatory power for corporate bond
returns in the presence of default and term risk factors.
6All of our results are qualitatively similar if we use the thirty year treasury return to construct the DEF
factor instead of the average of one-year and thirty-year returns.
8We add to the model two liquidity risk factors which are innovations in the illiquidity on
stocks and bonds. The stock illiquidity index is the market's average price-impact measure of
Amihud (2002), as modi¯ed by Acharya and Pedersen (2005). It is calculated as the equally-
weighted average of the daily ratio of absolute stock return to its daily dollar volume, and
averaged over the days of the month to provide the monthly stock illiquidity measure.7 The
bond illiquidity measure is the equally weighted quoted bid-ask spread on on-the-run short
maturity treasuries.8 The innovations in both of these indexes are the residuals from an
autoregressive model with AR(2) speci¯cation.9 We call the innovations in the stock and
bond liquidity indexes Silliq and Billiq, respectively.
Panel B of Table 1 presents summary statistics on the four factors that we use in this
study. The mean risk premium for the default factor (DEF) is 9.5 bps per month with t
= 1.72, while the average risk premium for the term factor (Term) is 17.7 basis points per
month, which is insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero. The mean of the two liquidity factors
is practically zero. Panel C of Table 1 shows the pairwise correlations between TERM,
DEF and the two liquidity risk factors. TERM and DEF are highly negatively correlated
(correlation = -0.529), whereas the two liquidity risk factors are less correlated with each
other (correlation = 0.086), and they are also not highly correlated with TERM and DEF
(the correlations of DEF with Billiq is -0.059 and with Silliq it is -0.141). This helps with a
clean interpretation of the liquidity risk e®ects we identify.
ENTER FIGURES 1-3
Figure 1 plots the investment grade and junk bond returns over time which appear to
be more variable during early 80's, the early 90's recession, and late 90's. Figure 2 plots
the time-series of TERM and DEF. Finally, Figure 3 plots the standardized bond and stock
market illiquidity innovations. The measured innovations in market illiquidity are high
during periods that were characterized by liquidity crises, for instance, the oil shock of 1973,
the 1979-1982 period of high interest rates, the stock market crash of 1987, the 1990 recession
and the 1998 LTCM crisis.
7To make ILLIQ stationary, the series is modi¯ed by the normalization formula due to Pastor and Stam-
baugh (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005): the ratio of the capitalizations of the market portfolio at
the end of month t - 1 and of the market portfolio at the end of July 1962.
8These data are as in Goyenko (2006). We thank Ruslan Goyenko for providing us the data.
9The AR(2) model for stock illiquidity is estimated beginning in July 1962 and the bond AR(2) model is
estimated beginning in November 1967, because longer period provides better estimation of the process.
94 Unconditional liquidity risk
In this section, we ¯rst examine as a benchmark the the unconditional e®ect of liquidity
factors on corporate bond returns divided into categories by ratings.
4.1 Methodology and results
First, we estimate the following time-series speci¯cation:
Rj;t = ®j + ¯j;T £ TERM + ¯j;D £ DEF
+ ¯j;SI £ Silliq + ¯j;BI £ Billiq + ²j;t ; (2)
for Rj;t being the value-weighted return on corporate bonds of rating class j in excess of the
30-day T-bill return j 2 fAAA, ..., CCC & Belowg. This speci¯cation is similar to that of
Fama and French (1993), augmented with the two liquidity risk factors.
ENTER TABLE 2
Table 2 Panel A presents the coe±cient estimates. For all ratings, the loadings on TERM
and DEF is positive. The TERM factor loading is statistically signi¯cant for all rating classes
and it is higher for the IG group of bonds (BBB and higher) than it is for junk bonds because
the duration of IG bonds is generally higher. The DEF loadings are monotonically increasing
down the ratings (except for the CCC group), consistent with worse credit quality.
Of primary interest to this paper, the liquidity risk loadings for both stocks and bonds,
Silliq and Billiq, are negative for all ratings below BBB. This means that when liquidity
worsens in either the stock or bond market, junk bond prices tend to fall. In contrast, the
e®ect of bond liquidity risk is positive for all IG bonds and the e®ect of stock liquidity risk
is also positive for the higher-rated IG bonds (above A). Overall, the coe±cients on liquidity
risks are almost monotonically declining from positive to negative values as we move from
AAA down to CCC bonds. This pattern suggests a \°ight to liquidity" phenomenon: When
illiquidity rises, there is a °ight from low-rated bonds which are generally less liquid to higher-
quality bonds which are more liquid. Consequently, the prices of high-rated corporate bonds
rise and the prices of low-rated bonds fall. This is in addition to the e®ect of the default
risk, which is captured by the e®ect of the factor DEF. The explanatory power of our model
is reasonably high for BBB and above (adj-R2 is between 76% and 83%), but it deteriorates
substantially for below-BBB bonds (adj-R2 falls from 51% for BBB to 11% for CCC and
10below).10
Table 2 Panel B reports the economic magnitudes of the di®erent factor loadings. In
particular, it reports for each factor loading and each rating class, how many standard
deviation in returns arises from a standard deviation shock to the factor. The calculations
employ the summary statistics reported in Table 1 and the coe±cients estimated in Panel
A of Table 2. For BBB and above, the liquidity risks are not economically signi¯cant: a
one standard deviation shock to liquidity risks produces a meagre 3% to 8% of standard
deviation in returns for these rating classes. The e®ects of TERM and DEF appear much
more signi¯cant than those of liquidity risks for BBB and above, with the e®ect of TERM
being the largest. But for junk bonds (BB and below), liquidity risk has greater economic
signi¯cance for bond returns than its signi¯cance for IG bond returns (between 10% to 40%),
while the e®ect of TERM declines. Surprisingly, the e®ect of DEF does not rise substantially
for bonds with rating lower than BBB.
In summary, Table 2 makes it clear that there is unconditional liquidity risk in corporate
bond returns, which is substantially higher for junk bonds than it is for investment grade
bonds. The switching signs of the liquidity risk as we move from high-rated to low-rated
bonds suggests the phenomenon of °ight to liquidity which we analyze in greater detail
below.
5 Conditional liquidity risk
As discussed in the introduction, most of the current academic literature has focused on
unconditional liquidity risk as we also analyzed thus far. However, as noted by Acharya
and Pedersen (2005), liquidity risk may matter more in periods of illiquidity crises and for
less liquid securities. From an economic perspective, there are sound reasons to believe that
the e®ect of liquidity risk is episodically high while being muted most of the time. This
could be because investor aversion to liquidity risk may exhibit time-variation. Of particular
relevance to corporate bonds, ¯nancial institutions are usually the marginal price-setters in
these markets. In normal times, such institutions are far away from their funding or capital
10de Jong and Driessen (2005) estimate a model with two liquidity risk factors as we do, but while we
employ two bond-market-based control variables, TERM and DEF, as in Fama and French (1993), they use
the S&P 500 index return as control. When we add the S&P 500 index return to our model, it is insigni¯cant
(see also Gebhradt et al (2005)). Their results on the e®ects of liquidity risks are somewhat di®erent. First,
all but one of the liquidity coe±cients for both stocks and bonds are negative, while in our analysis the
coe±cients switch from positive to negative as we decline in the bond rating. Thus our results suggest the
phenomenon of °ight to liquidity, which they do not ¯nd. Second, while their liquidity factors coe±cients
are generally more negative for lower-rated bonds, the pattern is not as close to being monotonic as ours.
11constraints. But in times of adverse liquidity shock, such as decline in funding liquidity
or a decline in asset values which erodes their equity capital and makes their position more
constrained (e.g., due to higher margin requirements), they may need to improve the liquidity
of their balance sheets. Then, ¯nancial institutions may re°ect an aversion to holding less
liquid corporate bonds in lieu of more liquid ones.11 This is more likely to happen during
recessions or ¯nancial crises.
Thus, we expect the following e®ect. In episodes of adverse economic conditions, a rise
in market illiquidity raises the expected illiquidity in the market, which in turn raises the
market illiquidity premium. This leads to a decline in all bond prices. However, in such
periods investors substitute from less liquid to more liquid bonds, which means that the
e®ect of liquidity risk is exacerbated for less liquid bonds, while liquid bonds become more
desirable.12 This makes the e®ect of liquidity risk on bonds become conditional on the state
of the economy and ¯nancial markets. We test this hypothesis as follows.
5.1 Regime-switching model of bond betas
We perform a regime-switching analysis of corporate bond betas on various risk factors,
separately for investment grade and junk bonds. In essence, we let the data tell us whether
there is a set of times when betas are substantially di®erent than in other times. The appar-
ent tendency of many economic variables such as GDP growth to behave quite di®erently
during economic downturns has been studied by Hamilton (1989) using this method. This
di®erential behavior is a prevalent feature of ¯nancial data as well and the regime switching
approach has been used to examine how they could be detected in asset prices, as in Ang and
Bekaert (2002). Watanabe and Watanabe (2007), using a similar methodology ¯nd evidence
supportive of there being a regime switch in the nature of liquidity risk of stock returns.
5.1.1 Methodology
We estimate a Markov regime-switching model for corporate bond betas as follows, allowing
the intercepts and the slope coe±cients (betas) of bond return models to potentially vary
between two regimes. We use two value-weighted returns on two bond portfolios, one of
investment grade (IG) bonds and one of junk bonds.
11For theoretical motivation of the e®ects of these kinds of asset, volatility or funding shocks and the
induced de-leveraging and market liquidity e®ects, see Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Acharya and Viswanathan
(2007), He and Krishnamurthy (2008, 2009) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
12See a similar analysis for stocks in Amihud (2002, p. 45).
12Investment grade bond excess returns (over the 30 day T-bill return) in Regime k (st = k)
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The state variable st determines whether it is regime 1 or regime 2 and the Markov
switching probability for state transition is speci¯ed as:
P(st = 1 j st¡1 = 1) = p ; and (4)
P(st = 2 j st¡1 = 2) = q : (5)
Similarly, junk grade bond excess returns (over the 30 day T-bill return) in Regime k
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This °exible covariance structure is intended to capture the notion that variance of both
the IG and Junk returns as well as the correlation between the two can be di®erent across
the two regimes. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. Since the
estimation procedure is standard (Hamilton, 1994), we do not provide details here but only
the results. We test for linear hypothesis about the coe±cients H0 : L¯ = c where L is a
matrix of coe±cients for the hypotheses and c is a vector of constants. The Wald chi-squared
statistic for testing H0 is computed as Â2
W = (L^ ¯ ¡ c)0[L^ V (^ ¯)L0]¡1(L^ ¯ ¡ c). Under H0, Â2
W
has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with r degrees of freedom where r is the rank of
L and V is the variance covariance matrix of the coe±cients. Two points are in order before
we proceed. One, the probabilities of state transition are assumed to be constant rather
than varying with some exogenous condition. In this sense, the conditionality of this model
arises purely from the regime switch rather than the likelihood of the regime switch being
13based on some economic variable. We will however relate the estimated probability of being
in regimes to macroeconomic and ¯nancial market variables. Second, the model also allows
for residuals to be heteroscedastic across the two regimes.
5.1.2 Results
The results in Table 3 Panel A show a clear pattern of two regimes in IG and junk bond
with varying betas, especially for the two liquidity variables. In Regime 1, the two liquidity
betas are statistically insigni¯cant for both IG and junk bonds. Note that any common
e®ect of liquidity on IG and junk bonds is indirectly captured by the factor DEF, so that
the liquidity e®ect that we document is possibly weaker than its full direct e®ect (this is
further discussed below in Section 5.4). Nevertheless, the liquidity betas in regime 2 present
quite a di®erent picture. For junk bonds, the two liquidity betas turn highly negative and
statistically signi¯cant. The beta of Silliq rises sixfold and that of Billiq rises over ¯vefold
compared to their magnitude in regime 1, both becoming statistically signi¯cant. In contrast,
for IG bonds, both liquidity betas become highly positive and statistically signi¯cant and rise
threefold to elevenfold. In other words, the liquidity shocks a®ect bond prices in opposite
ways in regime 2, depending on the bonds rating. IG bonds, which are more liquid, become
more desirable if illiquidity rises while junk bonds that are less liquid become less desirable,
with the e®ects being statistically signi¯cant in both ways. This e®ect is consistent with
\°ight to liquidity" in regime 2.
Panel B of Table 3 shows that the change in the liquidity betas is particularly signi¯cant
for IG bonds and for the Billiq beta, in which case the beta changes from being negative and
insigni¯cant in regime 1 to positive and signi¯cant in regime 2. The change in regime 2 is
also more pronounced for the beta of Silliq of junk bonds, where it changes from insigni¯cant
-37.06 in regime 1 to a signi¯cant -220.33 in regime 2. Tests of the di®erence in coe±cients
between IG and junk bonds in the two regimes are presented in Panel C of Table 3. The
tests show that in regime 1 there is no signi¯cant di®erence between the liquidity betas of
IG and junk bonds. However, in regime 2, both liquidity betas are signi¯cantly di®erent
between IG and junk bonds. It is in regime 2 that the e®ect of liquidity shocks on corporate
bonds is polarized, raising IG-bond prices and lowering junk bond prices.
ENTER TABLE 3
The factors TERM and DEF too have some of their coe±cients change between regimes.
Notably, while the beta of DEF rises in regime 2 for IG bonds, it does not change (even
14slightly declines) for junk bonds. This is striking because junk bonds are more vulnerable to
default risk, and given that the liquidity betas become much more negative for junk bonds
in regime 2. Comparing IG and junk bonds in regime 2 (see Panel C), we note that while
there is a signi¯cant di®erence between the e®ect of DEF on their values in regime 1, this
di®erence disappears in regime 2. Then, both IG and junk bonds are equally a®ected by
DEF, in spite of their di®erent likelihoods of default.
Finally, Panel C also shows that in regime 2, the di®erence between the TERM coe±cients
for IG and junk bonds is signi¯cant only in regime 1 but not in regime 2.
The picture that emerges from the results is as follows:
1. There is a sharp di®erence in regime 2 between the e®ect of liquidity shocks on prices
of IG and junk bonds, with the e®ects going in di®erent directions, being positive for
IG bonds and negative for junk bonds. This di®erence is absent in regime 1.
2. There is no di®erence in the e®ect of TERM and DEF between IG and junk bonds in
regime 2, while in regime 1 there is a signi¯cant di®erence between them.
Next, we assess the contribution of the regime switching model to the in-sample accuracy
of estimation by regressing actual bond returns in each regime on predicted returns. Ideally,
the intercept in this regression should be zero and the slope coe±cient should obviously be
1. We generate predicted returns in two ways: (a) from the regime switching model for that
regime, and (b) from an unconditional model whose coe±cients are the same for the entire
sample period, obtained by estimating our model with ¯xed coe±cients over 1973-2007.
Table 3 Panel D shows the estimated coe±cients from the regression of actual returns
on predicted returns. We have 4 regressions: for each of the two regimes, we do a regression
for IG and junk bonds. For all four regressions, under the conditional model, the slope
coe±cient is practically 1 (as one would expect trivially) and the intercept is zero, as ex-
pected. By comparison, when using predicted returns from the unconditional model, the
slope coe±cients of actual returns on predicted returns is away from 1. In regime 1, the
coe±cients of the predicted returns are below 1.0 for both IG and junk bond returns, with
the di®erence from 1.0 being highly signi¯cant. This means that the unconditional model
underestimates high returns and overestimates low returns. For regime 2, it is the opposite.
The predicted returns from the unconditional model underestimate actual returns for low
returns and overestimate them for high returns. This is evident from the slope coe±cient
being greater than 1.0, which is signi¯cant for IG bonds. Altogether, the results from this
table show the extent of improvement in the predictive power of the model when using our
regime-switching regression.
15As for the economic signi¯cance of the e®ect of liquidity risk on bond returns, we obtain
that the e®ect roughly doubles in the stress regime.13 We measure the economic signi¯cance
of the liquidity factors as Coeff ¤ ¾factor=¾return, where Coeff is the slope coe±cient of
the respective factor. Coeff and the two standard deviations are calculated separately for
regimes 1 and 2. We observe that the economic signi¯cance of the e®ects of the two liquidity
factors, Silliq and Billiq, is quite low in regime 1 but it greatly rises in regime 2. For IG
bonds, the e®ect of Silliq rises from 2% to 6% and that of Billiq rises from 0.7% to 7%. For
junk bonds, the rise in the e®ect of Silliq is from 5% to 16% and for Billiq the rise is from
4% to 13%.
5.1.3 The economic identi¯cation of regimes: Stress and macroeconomic factors
So far we have derived the regimes from a purely statistical procedure without any economic
input. The greater sensitivity of bond prices to default risk and liquidity risk in regime
2 suggests that regime 2 is associated with periods of economic stress. We investigate
this important issue below. We undertake an economic identi¯cation of the regimes, using
macroeconomic variables and con¯rm that regime 2 is indeed associated with economic
conditions that can be collectively de¯ned as \stress."
ENTER FIGURE 4
In Figure 4, we plot the model-implied probability of being in the stress regime.14 The
stress regime picks up most data points in 70's (picking up the oil-price shock of mid 70's
and the high interest-rate regime of late 70's), early 80's (again, during the high interest-rate
environment) and the ¯nancial market stress and the ensuring recession during the period
1998-2003. The regime-switching model also appears to pick up stress in 1989 leading up
to the NBER recession of 1990 and 1991, and does not identify mid 90's as a stress period.
However, the Russian default and LTCM episode of 1998 are identi¯ed as being in the stress
regime. The collapse of the internet bubble in March 2000, the 9/11/2001 attack and their
aftermath are also identi¯ed as stress regime. Finally, the probability of being in stress
regime rises starting 2007 but not as dramatically (we later present out-of-sample analysis
for 2008-2009).
13Detailed results are available upon request.
14This probability of being in state 2 is calculated at time t as the sum of two products: the product of
the transition probability from state 1 to state 2 with the probability being in state 1 at time t-1, and the
product of the transition probability from state 2 to state 2 with the probability being in state 2 at time t-1.
This sum is then multiplied by the ratio of the density under state 2 at time t to the conditional density of
the tth observation. See Hamilton, 1994 for details.
16We formally estimate the economic determinants of being in regime 2 by a multivariate
regression model where the dependent variable is the probability of being in regime 2, denoted
P2. This probability is modeled as a function of economic and ¯nancial variables associated
with market conditions and business cycles with one-month lag. These variables are as
follows (described in greater detail in Appendix I):
(i) NBER recession dummy variable: equals 1 in quarters de¯ned by the NBER to be
a recession. We exclude this variables from some of our estimations because the NBER
declares a recession ex post with signi¯cant delay, while we want the information about the
variables to be contemporaneous.
(ii) Negative market return dummy variable: equals 1 if there have been three consecutive
months of negative market return (including the given month), based on the CRSP value
weighted return.
(iii) Business Condition Index, due to Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti (2009): It is designed to
track real business conditions at high frequency. The average value of this index is zero.
Bigger positive values indicate better-than-average conditions, whereas more negative values
indicate worse-than-average conditions.
(iv) Prob(Recession) - Hamilton: a dummy variable that equals one if the probability of
recession estimated from a Hamilton (1989) model on U.S. GNP growth rates is greater than
70 percent (see Appendix II for its construction, also employing a regime-switching model).
(v) SW Index: the Chicago Fed's CFNAI index (a follow up measure of the Stock and
Watson (1989, 2002) recession index), with a bigger number indicating better business con-
ditions.
(vi) Paper-Bill spread: the the di®erence between the 3-month non-¯nancial commercial
paper rate and the 3-month T-bill secondary market rate. This spread indicates adverse
¯nancial and economic conditions
(vii) TED spread: the di®erence between the interbank loan rate and the T-bill rate.
This spread indicates adverse ¯nancial and economic conditions. Since the TED spread is
highly correlated with the paper bill spread we use the component that is orthogonal to the
paper bill spread.
(viii) EE measure: the growth in balance-sheet of broker-dealers, as a measure of risk
appetite of ¯nancial intermediaries (motivated by Adrian and Shin, 2008, and employed by
Etula, 2009). We use the growth in intermediaries' (aggregate Broker-Dealer) assets relative
to household asset growth as a measure of aggregate speculators' ease of access to capital.
This data is constructed from the U.S. Flow of Funds data which is available only at quarterly
17frequency for the full sample period. In our prediction, we use the growth rates based on past
one year's data. A rise in EE measure indicates expectations of good business conditions.
(ix) Equity market volatility: the square root of the monthly average of the squared daily
returns on the CRSP value weighted index with dividends.
We use two dependent variables. One is the probability of regime 2 for month t, P2t which
is estimated from our regime-switching model (see Hamilton (1994)) . We employ a standard
logit transformation of this probability, log[(P2t + c)=(1 ¡ P2t + c)], where c = 0:5=419 is
a constant that is added in order to accommodate the cases where we estimate P2 = 1 or
P2 = 0.15 The second is a dummy variable that equals 1.0 if P2t > 0:70 (this threshold is
also used by Hamilton (1989)). The ¯rst model is estimated by OLS and the second by logit.
ENTER TABLE 4
The estimation results, presented in Table 4, show that regime 2 is associated with eco-
nomic downturns. The signs of all the macroeconomic and ¯nancial variables are consistent
with the probability of regime 2 being higher in times of adverse economic conditions. We
obtain positive coe±cients for the NBER recession, Prob(Recession) - Hamilton, Negative
Market Return dummy, Paper-Bill spread, TED spread and Equity Volatility. These vari-
ables increase in value under economic stress. In addition, we obtain negative coe±cient
for SW Index and Business Conditions Index, which rise in value in economic upturn, so
their negative coe±cients say that the probability of regime 2 is associated with economic
downturn. The negative coe±cient of the EE measure suggests that as broker-dealers fore-
see the good times and increase their inventories, or increase their risk appetite when the
economy is headed into good times, regime 2 is less likely. But precisely during volatile
times, greater broker inventory growth in the past is associated with a greater likelihood of
the stress regime (the interaction between Equity volatility and the EE measure is positive
and signi¯cant), similar to the de-leveraging events observed in 2007 and 2008 in ¯nancial
markets.
In general, the robust conclusion that emerges is that regime 2 is associated with wors-
ening macro economic and stock market returns. Hence, we call it the \stress" regime and
regime 1 the \normal" regime. When employed in isolation, the explanatory power (R2)
of the regime determinants is of the order of 10% to 27%. When all variables are used to
explain the model-implied probability of being in the stress regime, the R2 exceeds 40%. In
the model with all variables (excluding the NBER recession dummy, which is known only ex
15See Cox (1970, p. 33).
18post), those that emerge as having the greatest statistical signi¯cance are Prob(recession)
- Hamilton, Business Condition Index, TED spread, EE measure, Equity volatility and the
interaction of the last two. In the logit regression with the stress regime dummy variable,
the variable Negative Market Return dummy also becomes signi¯cant.
These results provide a measure of con¯dence that our regime-switching results on liq-
uidity betas of junk bonds (Table 3) has a sound economic foundation. In this light, it is
clearer why in regime 2 { the stress regime { there is greater sensitivity of bond returns to
liquidity shocks and why IG bond returns become more sensitive to DEF, the default risk
factor.
5.2 Out of sample regime prediction during 1990-2007
The economic foundations of the stress regime enable us to predict its probability based
on economic time series and subsequently to predict corporate bond returns. We provide a
prediction of the probability of being in the stress regime (regime 2) of the Markov regime
switching model of Table 3 using the economic variables identi¯ed in Table 4. First, we ¯t a
model similar to model (14) of Table 4, using all the economic indicators except the NBER
dummy (given its ex post nature) to predict the stress regime employing only the data for
the ¯rst half of our sample period, 1/1973 to 12/1989. After estimating the coe±cients in
this model, we predict the probability of being in the stress regime, ^ P2, for the second half of
the sample period, 1/1990 to 12/2007, using a rolling estimation, month by month. That is,
we roll forward every month, then using the data available until the previous month develop
a predictive model for the stress regime until the current month, and then use this model to
predict stress regime for the current month, repeating this process till the end of the sample.
For example, we predict the stress regime for the month 1/1990 using data until 12/1989
and coe±cient estimates of a model similar to (14) in Table 4. Then, for month 2/1990, we
use all data until 1/1990 to re-estimate this model and generate ^ P2, and so on.
After having obtained the series ^ P2 for the period 1/1990-12/2007, we do a logit regres-
sion of the likelihood of being in regime 2 on the predicted probability ^ P2. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the actual probability of being in regime 2,
estimated from the regime switching model (model in Table 3 panel A), is above 70%.
ENTER TABLE 5
Results in Table 5 show how well the likelihood of being in regime 2 is predicted by the
economic series-based estimated regime-2 probability ^ P2. The coe±cient of ^ P2 is positive
19and signi¯cant, and its pseudo R-squared is 27%. We demonstrate the performance of the
model by its accuracy in discriminating regime 2 months from normal months, employing
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve analysis. The ROC curve analysis works
as follows. For every possible cut-o® point or criterion value selected in the logit model
to discriminate between the two regimes, there are some fraction of cases with the stress
months correctly classi¯ed as \True Positive" (TP) and some fraction of cases with the
stress months classi¯ed \False Negative" (FN). Also, some fraction of normal months will
be correctly classi¯ed as non-stress months or \True Negative" (TN) while some fraction of
normal months will be classi¯ed as stress months or \False Positive" (FP). In a ROC curve,
the TP rate (Sensitivity) is plotted as a function of the FP rate (1-Speci¯city) for di®erent
cut-o® points of ^ P2. Each point on the ROC plot represents a sensitivity/speci¯city pair
corresponding to a particular decision threshold. A completely random guess would produce
a point along a diagonal line (called line of no-discrimination) from the left bottom to the
top right corners. A test with perfect discrimination (no overlap in the two regimes) has
a ROC plot that passes through the upper left corner (100% speci¯city, 100% sensitivity).
Therefore the closer the ROC plot is to the upper left corner, the higher the overall accuracy
of the test.
We present a ¯gure that displays the ROC curve to assess the accuracy of this logit
model to predict regime 2, the stress regime. In the Y-axis we plot the true positive rate
(sensitivity), i.e. the proportion of actual stress regime months correctly classi¯ed by the
model. In the X-axis we plot the false positive rate (1-speci¯city), the proportion of normal
regime months, incorrectly classi¯ed as stress regime months by the model. Points above
the diagonal (random guess) indicate good classi¯cation results. The area under the curve
measures the accuracy of the model. The model has an impressive accuracy rate of about
89.01%. In other words, using lagged economic conditions as indicators in real time, the
model is able to predict the stress regimes in corporate bond returns with high accuracy.
5.3 Out of sample predictions during the ¯nancial crisis of 2008
We now test the accuracy of out-of-sample prediction of bond returns based on our regime-
switching model during the ¯nancial crisis of 2008 and the relatively less stressed period of
2009. Once again, we predict the probability of a given month of 2008 and 2009 being in the
stress regime, using the macroeconomic and ¯nancial market variables included in model (14)
in Table 6 and the coe±cients of that estimation model to predict the probability of being
in regime 2. Then, we calculate the predicted bond returns for each regime in each month
20of 2008 and 2009 using the coe±cients estimated on TERM, DEF and liquidity risk factors
in each regime shown in Table 3 Panel A and employing the realized values of TERM, DEF
and liquidity risk factors. Finally, we calculate the average return in the month by weighting
the regime 1- and regime 2-predicted returns by the respective regime probabilities obtained
in the previous step. This weighted average return constitutes the predicted bond return for
that month, conditional on the realized values of the four factors.
ENTER TABLE 6
In Table 6 Panel A we document the realized (excess) bond returns in each month of 2008
and 2009 for IG and junk bonds from data on iShares investment grade and high yield bond
indices, which are the most recent data available to us.16 We observe a high concentration of
negative junk bond returns in the second half of 2008 and in January of 2009, when the crisis
was intense. The table also presents our estimated value of ^ P2, the regime-2 probability.
Notably, the period with the cluster of negative returns is also when our model predicts
that ^ P2 = 1 or close to 1. Later in 2009, ^ P2 is lower and also the bond returns are mostly
positive. Also striking is the fact that in the months 10/2008 and 11/2008, where ^ P2 = 1,
the returns on IG bonds are positive whereas those of junk bonds are negative, indicating
the phenomenon of \°ight to liquidity" which we highlighted earlier.
We test the quality of the predicted returns by estimating a regression model of the
actual bond return as function of the predicted bond return. In such a regression with an
ideal predictor, we expect the intercept to be zero and the slope coe±cient to be 1. Panel
B of Table 6 documents the results of these regressions. The regression has a reasonably
good ¯t of 77% for the IG bonds and 74% for the junk grade bonds. Further, the slope
coe±cients on the predicted returns are statistically indistinguishable from 1.0 (at the 0.05
level) for both IG and junk bond grades, and the constant is not di®erent from zero in both
these regressions. The results of this regression, plotted in Figure 5, show that the actual-
predicted return relation is close to the 45% line of perfect ¯t. The RMSE of the regression
is very close to the RMSE of the 100% ¯t, again suggesting that the predicted returns do
a good job in explaining the actual returns. It can also be seen that the model is able to
predict bond returns reasonably well also during the more stressful period: months of Bear
Stearns' collapse (March 2008), Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy (September 2008) and the
post-Lehman months (October through December 2008).
Overall, we conclude that our regime-switching model provides a good description of
16The Merrill Lynch data on corporate bonds available to us ends in December 2007
21bond returns during the ¯nancial crisis year of 2008 as well as the relatively less stressed
period of 2009. The model is able to capture the dynamics of corporate bond returns both
in regime 2, (corresponding to all months except January and June in the year 2008) as well
as in regime 1, corresponding to six months in the year 2009.
5.4 Flight to liquidity
One interpretation of our overall results is that consistent with the literature on asset pric-
ing with frictions (as discussed in the introduction), stressed macroeconomic and ¯nancial
conditions make investors more risk-averse to illiquidity shocks and they respond by switch-
ing from junk bonds to investment-grade bonds which are known to be more liquid (see
Chen et al., 2007).17 An alternative explanation is that the rise in the e®ect of liquidity
shocks on bond prices proxies for heightened investor risk-aversion to extreme events or rare
disasters (Rietz, 1988 and Barro, 2006). Such events are argued to a®ect consumption sig-
ni¯cantly or are argued to be not well understood, so that an increase in their likelihood
induces an aversion to riskier assets such as junk bonds. Similar to this second alternative
is the volatility feedback explanation of Campbell and Hentschel (1992) by which increases
in aggregate volatility necessitate a reduction in investor holdings of risky assets, which in
general equilibrium, implies a reduction in their contemporaneous returns. In what follows,
we test for distinct e®ects of risk and liquidity on bond prices which imply, respectively,
°ight-to-quality/safety or °ight-to-liquidity (or both).
ENTER TABLE 7
In Table 7, we ¯rst study how the di®erential bond return|Junk return minus IG
return|is explained by default and liquidity risks in normal times and in times of stress
(regime 2). The estimation in column (1) omits the liquidity variables, which are included in
column (2). There are two points to note. First, the inclusion of the liquidity variables almost
doubles the explanatory power of the model, rising from Adj R2 = 10% to Adj R2 = 17%.
This attests to the importance of liquidity risk in determining the junk-IG di®erential return.
Second, the e®ect of the two liquidity variables is signi¯cant only when Prob (Regime 2),
the probability of the stress regime, is higher. The negative and signi¯cant coe±cients of
17Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) show that generally investment grade bonds have lower bid-ask spread
(quoted or implied) than junk bonds. Also, the frequency of zero-return days, another commonly employed
proxy of illiquidity, is of the order of 6-10 percent for investment grade bonds and 20-40 percent for junk
bonds.
22the liquidity risk factors in stress times indicate °ight to liquidity, in addition to the °ight
to safety which is captured by the negative coe±cient of Prob(Regime 2)*DEF.
Note that the factor DEF captures the common part of the illiquidity e®ect on IG and
junk bond returns. This is observed in Table 7, column (3), where both Billiq and Silliq e®ects
are statistically signi¯cant. However, Adj R2 is quite low, only 2%. Also, the interaction of
liquidity factors and Prob (Regime 2) is insigni¯cant. The pattern that emerges is that the
default risk is distinct from the liquidity risk, in the stress regime.
In the fourth and ¯fth columns of Table 7, the dependent variable is -(T-bill yield minus
FED Funds rate). This variable is immune to default risk and thus re°ects only liquidity
risk. It is also immune to policy e®ects and to maturity risk because the Fed fund rate is for
very short term.18 If a rise in illiquidity generates °ight to liquidity, then investors will switch
from all types of risk and illiquid investments to short-term T-bills which are the least risky
and most liquid instrument. Then, their price will rise and their yield will fall. There are two
points to note. First, the inclusion of the liquidity variables increases the explanatory power
of the model more than ¯ve times, from Adj R2 of 2% to Adj R2 of 11%. This attests to the
importance of liquidity risk in determining the T-bill return. Second, while T-bills' prices
rise on average in stress regime (the coe±cient of Prob(regime 2) is positive and signi¯cant),
the T-bills prices rise with an increase in illiquidity only in regime 2 { the coe±cient of Billiq
is practically zero while the coe±cient of Prob(Regime 2)*Billiq is positive and signi¯cant.
In other words, Treasury bills behave in a manner that is consistent with the behavior of
investment grade bonds. In contrast, T-bill returns do not vary with an increase in default
risk in the stress regime (DEF * Prob (Regime 2) is insigni¯cant). This is also consistent
with a °ight-to-liquidity phenomenon rather than a °ight-to-quality.
5.5 Flight to liquidity and bond maturity
We expect that the e®ects of liquidity shocks on bond returns that we have documented are
greater for longer-maturity bonds, which have greater duration in the sense of having greater
price elasticity to changes in the yield. Also, long-term corporate bonds have lower liquidity
than do short-term bonds (again, see Chen et al. (2007)), hence we expect that long-term
bond returns are more sensitive to liquidity shocks than are short-term bond returns. To
test this, we create three portfolios of junk-minus-IG returns for three di®erent maturities:
short|less than 4 years to maturity, medium| between 4 and 9 years to maturity, and
18This is similar to the test of Amihud and Mendelson (1991) on the yield spread between T-bills and
Treasury bonds of the same maturity.
23long|more than 9 years to maturity. We expect that in the stress regime (regime 2), the
e®ects of liquidity shocks will increase with maturity.
The results in the last three columns (6, 7 and 8) of Table 7 are consistent with our
expectations. The coe±cient of Billiq is generally negative, because a rise in bond illiquidity
lowers junk bond prices and raises IG bond prices. This e®ect is insigni¯cant in normal
times, but in times of stress it becomes more negative and signi¯cant, with the e®ect being
stronger for longer-maturity bonds. The coe±cient of the interactive term Prob(Regime
2)*Billiq declines monotonically from insigni¯cant -16.95 for short-term bonds to a signi¯cant
-83.21 for medium-term bonds and a signi¯cant -109.36 for long-term bonds. Similarly, the
coe±cient of Silliq is negative but insigni¯cant, but it becomes more negative and highly
signi¯cant when considering the interaction term Prob(Regime 2)*Silliq. This coe±cient
falls monotonically from -134.65 for short-term bonds to -266.33 for long-term bonds. These
e®ects of liquidity risk are present after controlling for the e®ect of default risk (captured by
the factor DEF), in both normal times and stress times.
6 Related literature
Our study is in line with the now burgeoning literature on asset pricing with frictions, showing
that risk premiums on assets °uctuate due to capital and ¯nancing conditions of ¯nancial
intermediaries. He and Krishnamurthy (2008, 2009) argue that adverse macroeconomic
conditions lower intermediary capital which in turn raises conditional volatility in asset
markets and causes risk-free interest rates to fall. Their asset-pricing model leads to a small
unconditional liquidity e®ect which can, however, turn into a large conditional liquidity e®ect.
These theoretical implications are consistent with our ¯ndings for corporate bond returns.
Acharya and Viswanathan (2007) show that when aggregate shock is su±ciently severe,
highly leveraged intermediaries are forced to liquidate their risky positions and asset markets
can clear only at \cash-in-the-market" prices (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992, Allen and Gale,
1994, 1998). Such prices depend on the ¯nancing capacity of low leverage intermediaries,
which is also limited in adverse conditions due to potentially severe agency problems in
raising external ¯nance. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that funding illiquidity
adversely a®ects market liquidity when there are margin constraints that rise in times of
higher volatility, and Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) argue that an asset's required return
depends not only on its beta on traditional risk factors but also on the asset's exposure to
conditions that cause some of its marginal investors to face rising margin constraints (and on
24the share of such constrained investors). Finally, He and Xiong (2009) and Morris and Shin
(2009) argue that liquidity risk should amplify credit risk rather than a®ecting asset prices
independently. Our result that junk bonds are adversely a®ected by liquidity risk factors in
times of aggregate stress is consistent with these results. In addition, we present results on
IG bond prices responding positively to illiquidity shocks which captures a °ight to liquidity,
which some these models do not consider.
There is now a large body of research showing that like other assets, bond yields re°ect
their liquidity characteristics and respond to liquidity risk. Amihud and Mendelson (1991)
show that short-term Treasury notes and Treasury bills with the same time to maturity
have di®erent yields due to di®erences in their liquidity (measured by the bid-ask spread
and broker fees): Bills, which are issued frequently, are more liquid and then notes and
consequently their yield is lower. Kamara (1994) ¯nds that the notes-bills yield spread is
an increasing function of liquidity risk, measured as a product of the volatility of yield and
the ratio of the bills-to-notes turnover. Elton and Green (1998) ¯nd that di®erences in
trading volume between Treasury securities explain di®erences in their yields. Boudoukh
and Whitelaw (1993) ¯nd that the designated benchmark bonds in Japan, which are more
liquid than similar bonds without such designation, have lower yield to maturity. And,
Longsta® (2004) ¯nds that higher yield on RefCorp government-agency bonds (issued by the
Resolution Funding Corporation) are higher than those on same-maturity Treasury bonds
whose risk is the same, since the RefCorp bonds are less liquid.
The e®ect of liquidity of corporate bonds on their yields is analyzed by Chen, Lesmond
and Wei (2007). They measure illiquidity as the implicit bid-ask spread using the imputed
value change that is needed to induce a transaction in the bond, assuming that if that
value change is smaller than transaction costs, a trade will not take place. They also use the
quoted bid ask spread as a measure of illiquidity. They ¯nd that illiquidity is greater for non-
investment grade bonds, and that after controlling for factors that a®ect yield, such as risk
of default and maturity, the corporate yield spread over Treasury is an increasing function
of illiquidity. The e®ect of illiquidity on bond yields is much larger for non investment
grade bonds. Chen et al. also ¯nd in a time-series analysis that changes in illiquidity induce
changes in yields in the same direction. Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) and Goldstein,
Hotchkiss and Sirri (2005) document corporate bond illiquidity using the TRACE data
starting around 2002. Both papers employ a price-impact measure, and Goldstein et al. also
employ bid-ask spread. Though their focus is the study of corporate bond transparency on
its liquidity, their results suggest signi¯cant trading costs for corporate bonds.
25Chacko (2005) imputes a corporate bond liquidity by assigning liquidity to a bond accord-
ing to the turnover of the fund that holds it. The idea follows Amihud and Mendelson (1986)
that in equilibrium, liquid assets are held by more frequently-trading investors. Chacko then
constructs a liquidity factor by sorting bonds into high- and low-liquidity portfolios and tak-
ing the return di®erence between them. The return on the high-minus-low liquidity portfolio
is then used to price bonds. The results show that bond returns are increasing in the expo-
sure to the bond risk factor, after controlling for other factors. Downing, Underwood and
Xing (2005) study a similar issue, but their measure of bond liquidity is a proxy of corporate
bond price impact similar to that of Amihud (2002). They ¯nd that long-term corporate
bonds have greater beta with respect to the bond illiquidity factor and that liquidity shocks
explain a sizable part of the time-series variation in bond returns. They further ¯nd that
illiquidity risk is priced in the context of a linear risk factor model (with other factors being
market, maturity and credit risk).
While these studies (and the more recent ones that we cite in concluding remarks) link-
ing corporate bonds' liquidity to their returns or yields make a promising start, the data
availability limits any signi¯cant time-series analysis, especially of conditional e®ects during
times of economic stress, which was our primary focus in this paper. Hence, a number of pa-
pers including ours have employed liquidity measures from treasury bonds (bid-ask spread or
on-the-run to o®-the-run spread) and stock markets (bid-ask spread or a price-impact mea-
sure). In particular, our analysis of corporate bond returns is over a long time-series from
1973 to 2008, allowing us to link liquidity e®ects to macroeconomic and ¯nancial market
stress. Such robust analysis is not feasible if one relies on corporate bond market liquidity
to measure liquidity risk as the only stress episode spanning the recently available TRACE
data has been the crisis of 2007-09.
More closely related to our work, Longsta®, Mithal and Neis (2005) show that the basis
between corporate bond spreads and credit default swap premia is explained by °uctuations
in treasury liquidity. de Jong and Driessen (2005) follow Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) by estimating two liquidity betas of bond returns with respect
to stock and bond liquidity shocks, using Amihud's (2002) ILLIQ for stock illiquidity and
quoted bid-ask spreads on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds, as well as the beta on the S&P
500 index. They ¯nd that bonds with lower rating and longer maturities have more negative
liquidity betas, implying that these bonds have higher illiquidity premium. The de Jong
and Driessen study is the closest to our unconditional analysis (Table 2), but they have
a much shorter time-series and they do not study conditional behavior of liquidity betas
26as we do. Lin, Wang and Wu (2010) is similar to de Jong and Driessen in studying the
unconditional cross section of expected corporate bond returns. They use the TRACE bond
data set from 2002-2007 and ¯nd that liquidity risk is priced. Sangvinatsos (2009) studies
the importance of corporate bonds in overall investor portfolio and documents that there
exist °ight-to-liquidity premia in investment grade bonds but not in high yield bonds.
Finally, the e®ect of bond liquidity transcends the bond market. Goyenko (2006) studies
the cross-market e®ect of liquidity and ¯nds that stock returns as well as Treasury bond
returns are a®ected by both stock and bond liquidity shocks. Furthermore, the exposure
of stocks to treasury bond liquidity appears priced in the cross-section of stock returns.
Similarly, Fontaine and Garcia (2007) extract a common component of on-the-run U.S.
Treasury bond premiums, similar to our measure of treasury bond liquidity, and show that
when this \funding liquidity" factor predicts low risk premia for on-the-run and o®-the-run
bonds, it simultaneously predicts higher risk premia on LIBOR loans, swap contracts and
corporate bonds.
7 Conclusion
What are the implications of conditional liquidity risk we documented in this paper for
corporate bond returns? Put simply, our evidence implies that during stress periods, liquidity
risk is a signi¯cant factor in a®ecting bond prices, especially of low-rated bonds. Ignoring
investors' °ight to liquidity and adhering to normal-time models is thus prone to signi¯cant
errors for researchers and investors in corporate bonds. For instance, the risk management
of corporate bond portfolios should consider not only its liquidity risk, but also the risk
that this risk will change. To the extent that investment grade bonds bene¯t during stress
periods whereas junk bonds get hurt, our results imply some diversi¯cation of this risk in
broad corporate bond portfolios.
We acknowledge that a relevant factor for corporate bond returns is also the liquidity
speci¯c to corporate bond market, since this liquidity may not necessarily be spanned by
treasury bond and stock market illiquidity. First, the corporate bond market trading tends
to be highly institutional in nature and shocks relevant for these institutions may need to
be identi¯ed.19 Acharya, Schaefer and Zhang's (2007) study of the excess co-movement in
credit default swaps around the General Motors (GM) and Ford downgrade of May 2005
19Chacko (2005) and Chacko, Mahanti, Mallik and Subrahmanyam (2005) employ a liquidity measure
based on turnover of portfolios containing corporate bonds and ¯nd that a return factor based on high and
low liquidity bonds explains the cross-section of bond returns.
27shows that the co-movement was linked to the risk faced by corporate-bond market-makers
when there were sudden liquidations of GM and Ford bonds. Further investigation along
these lines seems to be a fruitful avenue for research.
Second, some recent studies20 use newly available daily trading data on corporate bonds
from TRACE platform in the United States. The recent papers also show that liquidity
worsened substantially for corporate bonds from the onset of the crisis (3Q 2007) and that
this contributed to an enhanced response of bond spreads or returns to liquidity. These
e®ects are entirely consistent with the conditional liquidity e®ects we uncover for corporate
bonds over the period 1973 to 2008, even though due to data limitations we did not explicitly
employ any corporate bond liquidity measure.
Finally, recent work (Panyanukul, 2009) has also found liquidity risk to be a priced
factor in explaining sovereign bond returns, especially during the period 2007 to 2009. We
conjecture that there is a strong conditional component to liquidity e®ects in sovereign bond
returns too, whereby during times of macroeconomic and ¯nancial market stress, better-
rated sovereign bonds (e.g., the US treasuries) appreciate in value whereas the worse-rated
ones decline.
20See for example, Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2005), Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007), Dick-
Nielsen, Feldhutter and Lando (2008), Bushman, Le and Vasvari (2009), and Friewald, Jankowitsch and
Subrahmanyam (2009)
28Appendix I
Recession dates (year-month) based on macroeconomic data.
NBER Business Cycles: The economic expansions and recessions are determined by
the NBER business-cycle dates. The expansions (recessions) begin at the peak (trough)
of the cycles and end at the trough (peak). The following Table provides periods and
durations (in months) of each business-cycle phase during our sample period, January
1973 to December 2003. The business-cycle dates are available from the NBER web-
site: www.nber.org/cycles.html. The dates are 12/73-03/75;02/80-07/80;08/81-11/82;08/90-
03/91; 03/01-11/01; and 12/07;
Prob(Recession) - Hamilton: Following Hamilton (1989), we estimate the growth in GNP
as a regime switching model (details in Appendix II). Hamilton (1989) interprets the proba-
bility of being in regime 1 as the recession regime. We use a cut o® of the probability of being
in regime 1 greater than 70% to create this dummy variable. Quarters that are classi¯ed
as recession in this approach include: 1974-2 to 1975-1; 1980-2,3; 1981-2; 1981-4 to 1982-4;
1986-2; 1990-3 to 1991-4; 1993-2,3; 1995-2,3; 1998-2; 2000-3 to 2003-1; 2006-3 to 2007-1;
Mkt Return (negative): We code a month that is the third consecutive month in which
the CRSP value weighted market return with dividends is negative as a one and zero other-
wise. Months classi¯ed under this classi¯cation using our sample period include: 03/73 to
06/73; 05/74 to 09/74; 09/75; 03/77; 08/81 to 09/81; 02/82-03/82; 07/82 ; 02/84; 11/87;
08/90 to 10/90; 09/99; 11/00; 08/01 - 09/01; 06/02-07/02; 12/02; 02/03; 07/06; and 09/07
to 12/07;
SW index : \The Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) is a monthly index
designed to better gauge overall economic activity and in°ationary pressure. The CFNAI
is a weighted average of 85 existing monthly indicators of national economic activity. It is
constructed to have an average value of zero and a standard deviation of one. Since economic
activity tends toward trend growth rate over time, a positive index reading corresponds
to growth above trend and a negative index reading corresponds to growth below trend.
The CFNAI corresponds to the index of economic activity developed by James Stock of
Harvard University and Mark Watson of Princeton University in an article, \Forecasting
In°ation," published in the Journal of Monetary Economics in 1999. The idea behind their
29approach is that there is some factor common to all of the various in°ation indicators, and
it is this common factor, or index, that is useful for predicting in°ation. Research has
found that the CFNAI provides a useful gauge on current and future economic activity and
in°ation in the United States". (Reproduced from www.chicagofed.org). An index similar
in spirit is also the business conditions index which is also used in the analysis. The (ADS)
business conditions index is based on the framework developed in Aruoba, Diebold and
Scotti (2009). The average value of the index is zero. Progressively bigger positive values
indicate progressively better-than-average conditions, whereas progressively more negative
values indicate progressively worse-than-average conditions.
30Appendix II
Estimation of recession periods using Hamilton (1989)'s Markov Switching model.
This Table reports the results of the following markov switching model for the quarterly
growth rate in US GNP (yt):
Regime 1 (st = 1): yt = ®1 + ut, and
Regime 2 (st = 2): yt = ®2 + ut, where
ut = ½1ut¡1 + ½2ut¡2 + ½3ut¡3 + ½4ut¡4 + et;et » N(0;¾).
The Markov switching probability for state transition is given by:
P(st = 1 j st¡1 = 1) = p, and
P(st = 2 j st¡1 = 2) = q.
Following Stock and Watson's (2002) observation of a structural break in the GNP series
in 1984, we estimate the model for two distinct time periods: 1952 (Quarter 2) to 1984
and from 1985 to 2008 (Quarter 3). We use these models to estimate the probability of
being in regime 1 (interpreted by Hamilton (1989) as the recession regime) which is used in
speci¯cations of Table 4.
Period 1952:2 to 1984:4 1985:1 to 2008:3
Parameter Value Std.Error t-Value Value Std.Error t-Value
®1 -0.3403 0.2441 -1.39 0.8738 0.1880 4.65
®2 1.1727 0.1423 8.24 1.5922 0.2223 7.16
½1 0.0108 0.0895 0.12 -0.2506 0.0992 -2.53
½2 -0.0627 0.0811 -0.77 0.1994 0.0822 2.43
½3 -0.2462 0.0859 -2.87 -0.0532 0.0845 -0.63
½4 -0.2009 0.0867 -2.32 0.0391 0.0802 0.49
¾ 0.7699 0.0608 12.66 0.3246 0.0321 10.12
p 0.9014 0.7502
q 0.7620 0.8578
Log L -181.4 -56.44
Observations 131 95
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36Table 1 Panel A: Summary statistics on bond returns by credit rating classes (in basis points). IG
stands for bonds rated BBB and above. Junk stands for bonds rated BB and below. We use the Lehman Brothers
Fixed income database for the period January 1973 to December 1996, supplemented with data from the Merrill
Fixed Income Securities Database for the period January 1994 to December 2007, giving us a sample period of 1973
to 2007. Included bonds must be in the Lehman/Merrill indices with at least one year to maturity. The average
return for each rating group is value weighted by the amount outstanding in that month. Returns are calculated
using quoted prices or trades and matrix prices are discarded. Returns for credit rating classes are not available for
some months in the sample period, but returns by IG and Junk rating class are available for all months in sample
period.
Credit Rating N Mean Std.Dev Median Min Max
AAA 415 67.2 134.5 63.0 -535.4 736.8
AA 409 72.6 146.0 71.3 -414.7 772.3
A 415 72.1 152.5 73.8 -466.4 667.5
BBB 413 73.5 152.0 77.5 -500.2 745.7
BB 405 89.2 167.7 90.8 -670.1 850.0
B 405 99.4 221.7 108.7 -804.0 1069.7
CCC & Below 369 160.3 332.0 148.6 -905.0 1069.7
IG 420 67.6 127.3 63.0 -428.3 735.1
JUNK 420 97.6 177.9 101.4 -804.0 1069.7
Table 1 Panel B: Summary statistics on bond market factors. This table documents the return on the two
factor portfolios DEF, and TERM in basis points, and summary statistics on the Silliq and the Billiq factor. The
sample is from January 1973 through December 2007. The default factor (DEF) is the di®erence between the equally
weighted return on all corporate bonds in the database with at least one year to maturity and the average return
on one year and thirty year government bond from CRSP. The term factor (TERM) is the di®erence between the
thirty year government bond return and the one month T-bill return from CRSP. Silliq is the innovation in stock
market illiquidity measure ILLIQ from Amihud (2002), modi¯ed by Acharya and Pedersen (2005), calculated as the
residuals of an AR(2) process. Billiq is the innovation in bond market illiquidity using short maturity on-the-run
treasuries bid-ask spread as in Goyenko (2006), and calculated as the residuals of an AR(2) process.
N Mean Std.Dev Median Min Max
TERM 420 17.7 319.6 19.6 -1055.5 1162.5
DEF 420 9.5 113.5 10.6 -625.1 616.9
Silliq 420 0.00570 0.17289 -0.00962 -0.61920 0.61809
Billiq 420 0.00694 0.43048 0.03318 -1.48166 2.12169
37Table 1 Panel C : Pairwise Spearman correlations of bond market factors. Number in parentheses are




Silliq 0.007 -0.141 1
(0.88) (0.00)
Billiq -0.055 -0.059 0.086
(0.26) (0.23) (0.08)
Table 2 : Regressions of bond portfolio return on bond market factors. Bond returns for each rating group
are in excess of the 30 day T-Bill return. ¯t;¯d;¯si and ¯bi are, respectively, the regression coe±cients of TERM,
DEF, Silliq and Billiq, as de¯ned in Table 1, Panel B. Bond returns are calculated as de¯ned in Table 1, Panel A.
Panel A
Coe±cients t-Stat
Rating ® ¯t ¯d ¯si ¯bi Adj-Rsq ® ¯t ¯d ¯i ¯bi N
AAA -0.11 0.42 0.76 65.33 14.01 0.76 -0.03 35.98 22.85 3.50 1.89 415
AA 3.93 0.47 0.80 48.16 2.41 0.78 1.17 38.19 23.13 2.45 0.31 409
A 2.49 0.50 0.90 42.34 -1.32 0.83 0.79 43.75 27.48 2.31 -0.18 415
BBB 3.86 0.47 0.97 24.11 -11.52 0.75 1.02 33.85 24.46 1.08 -1.30 413
BB 20.81 0.38 0.97 -83.39 -56.89 0.51 3.49 17.31 15.79 -2.38 -4.13 405
B 32.91 0.35 0.99 -156.93 -70.41 0.30 3.50 10.13 10.16 -2.83 -3.24 405
CCC & below 97.72 0.20 0.89 -308.25 -65.06 0.11 5.89 3.36 5.29 -3.18 -1.75 369
Panel B
Ratio to ¾returns of
Rating ¾t ¾d ¾si ¾bi
AAA 99.80% 64.12% 8.40% 4.48%
AA 102.07% 67.83% 6.19% 0.77%
A 105.11% 75.68% 5.44% 0.42%
BBB 98.75% 81.64% 3.10% 3.69%
BB 71.69% 82.15% 10.72% 18.20%
B 50.01% 83.58% 20.17% 22.53%
CCC & below 19.25% 74.84% 39.61% 20.82%
38Table 3 Panel A: Estimation of a markov regime switching model
This table provides the estimates of the following model.
Investment Grade Returns (in excess of the 30 day T-Bill return):
















Junk Grade Returns (in excess of the 30 day T-Bill return):




















IG;st ½st ¾IG;st ¾Junk;st
½st ¾IG;st ¾Junk;st ¾2
Junk;st
!
Markov switching probability for state transition:
P(st = 1 j st¡1 = 1) = p
P(st = 2 j st¡1 = 2) = q
We test for linear hypothesis about the coe±cients H0 : L¯ = c where L is a matrix of coe±cients for
the hypotheses and c is a vector of constants. The Wald chi-squared statistic for testing H0 is computed as
Â2
W = (L^ ¯ ¡ c)0[L^ V (^ ¯)L0]¡1(L^ ¯ ¡ c). Under H0, Â2
W has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with r degrees
of freedom where r is the rank of L and V the variance covariance matrix of the coe±cients.
39Regime 1
Investment Grade Junk Grade Parameters
Coe® t-stat Coe® t-stat
Constant 2.12 1.09 29.81 5.17 p 0.95
TERM 0.35 49.10 0.28 12.48 q 0.93
DEF 0.37 11.94 1.10 9.81 ½st=1 0.11
Silliq 14.39 1.40 -37.06 -1.28 ½st=2 -0.39
Billiq -1.97 -0.42 -12.32 -0.82
¾i 23.87 81.96
Regime 2
Investment Grade Junk Grade
Coe® t-stat Coe® t-stat
Constant 4.06 0.91 32.60 2.18
TERM 0.52 30.09 0.44 7.41
DEF 0.96 26.76 1.04 8.63
Silliq 51.24 2.50 -220.33 -4.11
Billiq 22.49 2.60 -65.63 -2.47
¾i 53.51 186.94
Table 3 Panel B:
Wald tests for di®erences in coe±cients between Regime 1 and Regime 2
Investment Grade Junk Grade
Chi-Sq p-value Chi-Sq p-value
TERM & DEF 179.35 0.00 10.67 0.00
Liquidity 9.05 0.01 10.53 0.01
TERM 91.08 0.00 6.01 0.01
DEF 170.13 0.00 0.10 0.75
Silliq 2.47 0.12 8.90 0.00
Billiq 6.19 0.01 2.97 0.08
Table 3 Panel C:
Wald tests for di®erences in coe±cients between IG and Junk
Regime 1 Regime 2
Chi-Sq p-value Chi-Sq p-value
TERM & DEF 94.79 0.00 4.22 0.12
Liquidity 3.37 0.19 28.85 0.00
TERM 9.78 0.00 1.29 0.26
DEF 40.25 0.00 0.34 0.56
Silliq 3.08 0.08 24.04 0.00
Billiq 0.49 0.49 8.37 0.00
Log Likelihood -4677.78
Sample Period 1973:01 - 2007:12
40Table 3 Panel D: In-Sample accuracy of the Regime Switching Model. This table uses the regime switching
model estimated in panel A to obtain estimates of investment grade (IG) and junk grade bond returns in each regime
and compares it against the actual realizations. We also estimate an unconditional model over the entire sample
(1973-2007) and obtain the predictions. Panels show the regression of the actual bond returns against the predicted
bond returns with a test of the slope coe±cient = 1.0 and the intercept being 0. ¤¤¤;¤¤;¤ indicates signi¯cance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Actual returns
IG - Regime 1 Junk - Regime 1
Const. -.34 -1.68 -.39 8.01
(1.46) (1.81) (5.98) (5.96)
Predicted - Regime 1 Parameters 1.00¤¤¤
(.02)
Predicted - Unconditional Parameters .86¤¤¤
(.02)
Predicted - Regime 1 Parameters .99¤¤¤
(.06)
Predicted - Unconditional Parameters .80¤¤¤
(.05)
Obs. 269 269 269 269
AdjR2 .94 .91 .48 .45
F-test if 0.00 78.05 0.01 13.10
Slope = 1.0 (p-value) (0.977) (0.000) (0.935) (0.000)
Actual returns
IG - Regime 2 Junk - Regime 2
Const. 1.07 4.95 .36 -4.81
(4.54) (4.54) (16.11) (16.50)
Predicted - Regime 2 Parameters 1.00¤¤¤
(.03)
Predicted - Unconditional Parameters 1.24¤¤¤
(.04)
Predicted - Regime 2 Parameters 1.00¤¤¤
(.09)
Predicted - Unconditional Parameters 1.17¤¤¤
(.11)
Obs. 151 151 151 151
AdjR2 .88 .88 .43 .42
F-test if 0.02 40.12 0.00 2.31
Slope = 1.0 (p-value) (0.877) (0.000) (0.966) (0.131)
41Table 4: Explaining the probability of regime 2 (stress regime) with macroeconomic, ¯nancial market
and bank balance sheet variables
This table presents OLS and logit estimates of the probability of being in regime 2 as a function of macroeconomic and
¯nancial market variables. The OLS regression uses as dependent variable the probability of being in regime 2 in any month,
that is estimated along with the regime switching model in Table 3. The probability undergoes a logit transformation to map
it into the real line, with a constant correction term following Cox (1970, p.33), to accommodate it being bounded between
zero and 1. The dependent variable in the logit model is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the probability of being in regime
2 is greater than 70%. Odd (even) numbered speci¯cation are OLS (logit) estimations, where the explanatory variables are
lagged one period. NBER Recession is a dummy variable that equals for NBER recession dates. SW Index is the Stock and
Watson recession index with positive numbers indicating growth above trend. Prob(Recession) ¡ Hamilton is the result
of the markov switching model for the quarterly growth rate in U.S. GNP. We use these models to estimate the probability
of being in regime 1 (interpreted by Hamilton(1989) as the recession regime) greater than 70%. Negative Market Return
is a dummy variable that equals one for three consecutive months of negative market return (the CRSP value-weighted
return with dividends). Business Conditions Index, by based on the framework developed in Aruoba, Diebold and Scotti
(2009). The average value of the index is zero, with bigger positive (negative) values indicating better- (worse)-than-average
conditions. Paper ¡ Bill Spread is the di®erence between the yield on the 3 month non-¯nancial commercial paper rate and
the 3 month T-bill secondary market rate. TED Spread is the di®erence between the yield on the 3 month Euro $ deposit
rate and the 3 month T-bill secondary market rate, orthogonal to the paper bill spread. Equity V olatility is the square
root of the monthly average squared daily returns on the CRSP value weighted index with dividends. EE measure is the
growth in broker dealer balance sheet (relative to households) over the previous 12 months as calculated by Etula (2009).
The sample period is January 1973-December 2007. ¤¤¤;¤¤;¤ indicates signi¯cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.







































Obs. 419 419 419 419 419 419 419 419
AdjR
2=PseudoR
2(%) 18 13 11 8 14 9 22 16













SW Indext¡1 .12 .06 .009 -.02
(.33) (.23) (.32) (.24)
Prob(Recession)- Hamiltont¡1 .98 .64 1.21
¤ .83
¤
(.66) (.47) (.65) (.47)
Negative Market Returnt¡1 .86 .77 1.11 .95
¤
(.92) (.56) (.88) (.57)





(.35) (.29) (.35) (.29)
Paper-Bill Spreadt¡1 .002 -.002 .005 -.0003






















(26.19) (10.15) (20.75) (9.01) (20.57) (9.17)







(1771.89) (1276.12) (1326.92) (880.58) (1306.43) (906.29)
Obs. 419 419 419 419 419 419
AdjR
2=PseudoR
2(%) 27 21 42 33 42 33
43Table 5: Estimation of the likelihood of regime 2 (stress regime) - out-of-sample tests
This table tests the performance of the probability of regime 2, as predicted by the economic model in Table 4, when compared
to the probability of regime 2 obtained from the markov regime switching model of Table 3. First we estimate model (14) of
Table 4 using only the data for January 1973-December 1989. Using these estimates, we predict the probability of being in
regime 2 for January 1990, then we roll forward every month and repeat the process until we estimate the probability of regime
2 for all months during January 1990-December 2007. We present a logit estimation of the probability of being in regime 2 as
as a function of the predicted Prob(Regime 2) as the independent variable. The dependent variable in a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the probability of being in regime 2, obtained from the estimates in Table 3, is greater than 70% (following the
cuto® level in Hamilton (1989)). We also present a ¯gure that displays the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve
to assess the accuracy of this logit model to predict regime 2. In the Y-axis we plot the true positive rate, the proportion
of actual regime 2 months correctly classi¯ed by the model. In the X-axis we plot the false positive rate, the proportion
of not regime 2 months that are incorrectly classi¯ed as regime 2 months by the model. The diagonal represents random
guess. Points above the diagonal indicate good classi¯cation results, with the total area under the curve relative to the area
of the square measuring the accuracy of the model. ¤¤¤;¤¤;¤ indicates signi¯cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.










































0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 - Specificity
Area under ROC curve = 0.8901
44Table 6. Out of Sample Predictions during the Financial Crisis years, 2008-2009.
Panel A shows the actual investment grade and junk grade bond returns (in excess of the 30 day T-bill return) for
the years 2008-2009 in basis points. We use the data on iShares investment grade and high yield bond indices to
compute the bond returns for these years. The table also presents the estimated probability of regime 2, obtained
from speci¯cation (14) in Table 4, using the economic time series for December 2007-November 2009 (the predictive
economic series are lagged one month). Panel B presents the regression of the actual bond returns on the predicted
bond returns. The table presents the intercepts and slope coe±cients for both investment grade and junk grade
bonds, with a test of the slope coe±cient = 1.0. To predict bond returns for 2008 and 2009, we proceed as follows:
First, we predict the probability as explained in Panel A. Next, we weight the prediction of bond returns itself for
2008-2009 from the regime switching model of table 3 by the respective regime probabilities to obtain the predicted
bond returns (in excess of the 30 day T-bill return). Number in parentheses under the coe±cients are standard errors.
Panel A IG returns Junk returns Predicted IG returns Junk returns Predicted
Date Actual Actual Prob(regime 2) Date Actual Actual Prob(regime 2)
200801 -139.2 -211.3 0.60 200901 -534.6 -1023.7 0.98
200802 -115.4 80.4 0.95 200902 45.3 188.7 0.93
200803 57.3 316.7 0.83 200903 272.9 1295.6 0.71
200804 -232.7 -60.1 0.97 200904 228.3 280.2 0.01
200805 -185.9 -384.6 0.71 200905 285.0 329.0 0.42
200806 23.0 42.4 0.59 200906 452.1 669.7 0.63
200807 1.9 -102.9 0.78 200907 82.6 -172.4 0.83
200808 -1193.2 -1140.2 0.87 200908 125.6 562.4 0.38
200809 -209.1 -1228.2 0.95 200909 -50.6 -56.0 0.62
200810 325.1 -740.1 1.00 200910 193.2 167.3 0.74
200811 1293.0 1548.1 1.00 200911 -209.2 361.5 0.24
200812 -182.3 -101.6 1.00 200912 152.8 -28.0 0.57




Predicted IG returns 0.832¤¤¤
(.098)




F-test if 2.92 1.81
Slope = 1.0 (p-value) (0.102) (0.192)
45Table 7: Flight to Liquidity E®ects
This table presents OLS regressions of returns (or yields) of various bond (assets) portfolios on the probability of
being in regime 2 (stress), obtained from the estimation in Table 3, on the four bond market factors described in
Table 2 and on the interaction these factors and Prob(regime 2). The returns on Junk and IG (investment grade)
are value-weighted averages of the bond portfolios in each group. The estimations in columns (6)-(8) use returns on
junk and IG bond portfolios groups by maturity: short-term is up to 4 years, medium term is between 4 and 9 years,
and long term is longer than 9 years. Columns (4)-(5) are the yields on 90-day T-bill in excess of the overnight
Fed Funds e®ective rate (to remove policy e®ects). ¤ ¤ ¤;¤¤;¤ indicates signi¯cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively.
Junk-IG Junk-IG DEF -(T-Bill Yld -(T-Bill Yld Short Medium Long
Return Return Return - Fed Funds) - Fed Funds) Junk-IG Junk-IG (Junk-IG)










(5.92) (5.94) (4.08) (3.83) (2.80) (4.92) (7.65) (10.10)
Prob(Regime 2) -3.82 .21 1.26 47.69
¤¤¤ .52 -9.66 15.67















(.12) (.12) (.03) (.05) (.10) (.16) (.17)
Silliq -29.44 -55.98
¤ .39 -13.62 -25.55 -14.08 -79.67
(35.49) (33.36) (18.55) (14.31) (28.15) (49.83) (61.81)
Billiq -.27 -29.12
¤¤ 23.80
¤¤ -7.80 -6.34 -4.36 -12.17
(11.98) (12.09) (10.40) (7.07) (9.87) (15.92) (19.20)
Prob(Regime 2) * TERM .04 .006 .03 -.07 .06
(.09) (.09) (.05) (.08) (.12)






(.22) (.20) (.06) (.15) (.22) (.25)
Prob(Regime 2) * Silliq -263.73
¤¤ -78.40 7.59 -134.65 -246.62
¤¤ -266.33
¤
(103.32) (110.22) (41.54) (88.63) (120.16) (146.69)





(36.27) (30.54) (19.94) (26.41) (45.29) (53.01)
Obs. 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420
AdjR
2(%) 10 17 2 2 11 9 23 36
46Fig. 1,2,3. Time Series behavior of bond returns and bond market factors
The top panel (Fig.1.) plots in basis points the returns on corporate bonds by credit rating classes. See de¯nitions in Table 1. The middle (Fig.2.)
and bottom (Fig.3.) present the four bond market factors that we use: TERM (term premium), DEF (default premium), Silliq (innovations on




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































47Fig.4. Probability of high illiquidity stress regime estimated from a regime switching model.
For details on the regime switching model refer Table 3. We use the model to estimate the probability of being in regime 2 interpreted as the



































































































































































































































































































48Fig.5. Regime Switching Model - Out of Sample Predictions during the Financial Crisis year of 2008
and year 2009.
This ¯gure presents the regression of the actual bond returns against the predicted bond returns for the period 2008-2009. Actual returns are
obtained from data on iShares investment grade and high yield bond indices. The returns used are in excess of the 30 day T-bill return. To
predict bond returns for 2008 and 2009, we proceed as follows: First, we predict the probability of regime 2 as explained in Table 6, Panel
A. Next, we weight the prediction of bond returns itself for 2008-2009 from the regime switching model of table 3 by the respective regime



















RMSE (45 degree line) = 216.34
RMSE (regression) = 212.23
Actual = 0.83 Predicted + 8.78
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RMSE (45 degree line) = 344.74
RMSE (regression) = 341.72
Actual = 0.86 Predicted + 50.34
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